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Abstract
This study examined children’s nuanced understanding of prosocial liars and selfserving liars across the following three areas: children’s willingness to learn
information from liars, their judgments of liars through their friend preferences,
and their visual attention to liars. As children develop theory of mind skills, they
learn they can manipulate other’s knowledge states by telling lies. They also
evaluate lying based on whether the liar has self-serving or prosocial intentions,
with the former judged more negatively and the latter judged more positively.
Based on research findings indicating that children demonstrate selective trust in
informants based on their previous accuracy or reliability, the current study aimed
to discern whether children (ages 4-11 years old) base their willingness to learn
novel information on their evaluations of deceptive informants with sensitivity to
the informants’ intentions. Results suggest that as children age and increase in
moral theory of mind, they increasingly trust information from a prosocial lying
informant compared to a neutral informant, and appear to trust information from a
self-serving lying informant marginally less than a neutral informant. Further,
regardless of intentions of the lying informant, children tend to avoid choosing the
lying informant as a friend. Some differences in visual attention are also
discussed. Overall, this research indicates that children may have a more nuanced
understanding of the intentions of deceptive informants that becomes more
pronounced with age, yet children still prefer to have friends who do not lie.
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Introduction
As children are learning to navigate their social worlds, they begin to tell
lies in various situations, such as covering up transgressions or to receive rewards.
This type of lying is referred to as self-serving lying and involves lying to protect
oneself often at another person’s expense. Typically, children are instructed by
parents and other adults that lying is a bad behavior and they should avoid
engaging in this behavior. Yet, parents encourage children to lie in politeness
situations, such as when children receive an undesirable gift and are encouraged
to tell the gift-giver that they indeed do like the gift. This type of lying is referred
to as prosocial lying. Prosocial lying involves lying to dampen the emotional
distress or harm that another may feel. Since children are told not to lie, this
concept of lying for a prosocial reason may be confusing at a young age.
Of course, children also interact with people in their everyday
environments who may lie to them or others. Given this, children need to develop
the skills to differentiate between people who are reliable and unreliable sources
of information to determine who they should trust. One possibility is that children
perceive all people who lie as unreliable sources of information; if this is the case,
then children should avoid trusting information from individuals who exhibit lietelling behaviors. My master’s thesis examined this possibility to determine
whether and when children develop a differential understanding of different types
of lying, specifically distinguishing between prosocial lying and self-serving
lying.
Development of Theory of Mind
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As lying becomes relevant in children’s lives, theory of mind skills play
an important role. Theory of mind refers to the ability to understand that others
have a set of beliefs, desires, intentions, and knowledge states that may differ
from one’s own mental state. These skills begin to develop in early childhood and
are utilized to explain others’ actions. According to Bartsch and Wellman (1995),
the development of theory of mind occurs in three phases, as discussed next.
Around two years of age, children use desires to explain others’ actions
and have little to no understanding about beliefs - this is referred to as the desire
phase. Children at this age can talk about and understand that people do things to
satisfy their individual desires, but they fail at belief reasoning tasks that threeyear-old children pass with ease (Wellman & Woolley, 1990). For example,
children can understand that their friend stole a cookie because that is what their
friend desired, but they have more difficulty understanding that their friend stole a
cookie because they desired it and believed the action they took would satisfy the
desire. Around three years of age, children begin to have an understanding of
beliefs, yet they do not use their knowledge of beliefs to explain the actions of
others – this transitory phase is called the desire-belief phase. Past research has
found evidence that three-year-old children have an understanding of beliefs and
even false beliefs- having an understanding that others can be mistaken about the
reality of a situation (Mitchell & Lacohee, 1991; Moses, 1993; Siegal & Beattie,
1991). Yet even with this knowledge, children in this phase of development still
tend to explain others’ actions in terms of desires, even when probed to refer to
beliefs (Bartsch & Wellman, 1989).
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It is not until around four years of age that children begin to use their
understanding of beliefs and false beliefs to explain actions – referred to as the
belief-desire phase. Four-year-old children begin to use beliefs more consistently
to explain actions by attributing mental states, beliefs, and knowledge states to
other people. Children of this age start to recognize that people engage in actions
because they believe the actions will help achieve their desires regardless of the
outcomes of those actions. Once children develop the theory of mind skills to this
point, they are able to understand that others have a different knowledge set than
their own and can use this information in a variety of ways, including engaging in
lie-telling behaviors themselves as well as realizing that others could be lying. For
example, once a four-year-old child realizes that his mother does not know he
stole cookies from the cookie jar, he can use his understanding of her knowledge
state (that she doesn’t know who took the cookies) to engage in a self-serving
lying behavior (e.g., by telling his mother “it wasn’t me” when questioned).
Deception and lie-telling are relevant to moral understanding and
evaluations, especially as children are able to make inferences about the beliefs of
others and their intentions. For example, is the act of deceiving others always
considered a bad behavior? Or do moral evaluations change based on children’s
understanding of a lie-teller’s intentions? Researchers developed a task, called
“The Accidental Transgressor” in order to measure children’s morally relevant
false belief theory of mind (Killen, Mulvey, Richardson, Jampol, & Woodward,
2011). In this task, children are read a story about a student who unknowingly
throws out his or her classmate’s cupcake in an attempt to help a teacher clean the
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classroom, and are asked questions regarding the accidental transgressor’s
knowledge state and intentions. Results revealed that older children (7.5-yearolds) judged the intentions of the transgressor more positively than did younger
children (3.5-year-olds). Further, when asked why, older children were more
likely to justify their evaluations by mentioning that the transgressor did not have
negative intent, indicating a more developed understanding of accidents and the
intentions of others. Children’s ability to understand the intentions of others in a
morally relevant situation may indeed play a role in their ability to understand the
intentionality of lie-tellers in prosocial and self-serving situations as well.
Summary
Young children tend to understand and explain actions only using desire
psychology. By three years of age, they begin to understand beliefs and false
beliefs, yet do not utilize this understanding in their explanations of others’
actions. Around four years of age, children begin to systematically attribute
mental states, beliefs, and knowledge states to others and use this information to
explain their individual actions. Given this developing understanding of others’
mental states, it is of interest to examine the ages at which children begin to
engage in lying behavior themselves as this involves understanding that others do
not have knowledge about the actual circumstances of an event. Further, it may be
important to examine children’s morally relevant theory of mind in relation to
their understanding of prosocial and self-serving lies.
Development of Lying in Children
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As theory of mind skills develop, children not only have the ability to
understand someone has a different knowledge state than their own, but they also
learn they can manipulate others’ knowledge states through lying. Children then
can use these skills in two main ways – telling self-serving lies to manipulate
someone’s mental state for selfish reasons or telling prosocial lies to do so for the
emotional benefit of others, demonstrating social and emotional competence.
Generally, children first begin to tell lies to cover up a transgression or to get a
reward. Then, children begin to tell anti-social or self-serving lies for either their
own gain or to avoid punishment (Talwar & Crossman, 2011). Typically, the
development of lying behaviors is seen as a bad behavior that is worrisome to
parents and caretakers.
Research examining children’s development of these negative lying
behaviors often utilizes a temptation resistance paradigm, in which children are
asked not to peek at an object when an experimenter steps out of the testing room
(Evans & Lee, 2013; Talwar & Lee, 2008). Upon return, the experimenter asks
the children if they peeked at the toy. If the children lie, they are then asked what
they believe the object to be and why. Results from these studies have indicated
that children are able to tell lies around the age of three to four years old (Talwar
& Lee, 2008); one study even suggested that children as young as two to three
years old have the ability to do so and that this ability to tell lies correlates with
children’s levels of executive functioning on a Stroop task (Evans & Lee, 2013).
As children reach five to six years of age, they demonstrate better lying skills,
such as being able to maintain their lies. For example, when the children who
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peeked in the above study (Talwar & Lee, 2008) are asked what they think is the
object, younger children will respond naming the correct object, indicating that
they in fact did lie about peeking, while children around five or six will maintain
their lie by saying they don’t know or giving the name of a different object.
Further, seven- to eight-year-olds demonstrate the ability to tell more
sophisticated lies (Talwar & Lee, 2008). After being probed for what the object is,
children are asked why they think that is the object. Although five- and six-yearolds are able to maintain their lies, when asked why they tend to implicate
themselves or give short responses for this question. On the other hand, sevenand eight-year-old children are able to give more elaborate responses and keep the
lie going. Thus, as children age, they become more skilled at lying.
Most studies have focused on this negative type of lie-telling, but the
development of lying behaviors actually demonstrates a normative developmental
milestone, regardless of whether lie-telling behaviors are considered a desirable
trait (Talwar & Crossman, 2011). Interestingly, the telling of prosocial lies tends
to begin later in the developmental timeline than anti-social lies (Talwar &
Crossman, 2011). A study conducted by Talwar, Murphy, and Lee (2007) aimed
to examine children’s development of prosocial lying behaviors using an
undesirable gift paradigm, in which either a child or their parent is presented with
an undesirable gift, such as a bar of soap, and then is asked by an experimenter
whether they like the gift. In the case of the parent receiving the gift, the child is
encouraged by the parent to lie on their behalf. Results from this study indicated
that most children between the ages of three and eleven are willing and able to tell
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prosocial lies. Moreover, the percentage of children telling these lies increases
with age, and the older children told more elaborate prosocial lies.
In addition to engaging in lie-telling behaviors themselves, children have
to recognize when others are lying to them. Lee and colleagues (1997)
investigated the differences and similarities in children’s evaluations of truth- and
lie-telling situations by altering the intentions of the truth- or lie-teller. Children in
this study were seven, nine, and eleven years old (n = 120 Chinese children, n =
108 Canadian children). Children heard four different scenarios that varied in
whether the protagonist performed a prosocial or antisocial deed and either lied or
told the truth about it to a teacher. Not surprisingly, children rated confessing to
an antisocial deed positively, whereas lying about an antisocial deed was rated
negatively. This result strengthened with age. In contrast, when the protagonist
lied for a prosocial reason, seven-year-olds rated this negatively, whereas nineand eleven-year-old children’s ratings were either neutral or positive. This
indicates that as children age, they begin to take intentionality into account when
judging lie-telling behaviors, which may influence their willingness to learn from
various lying informants.
Research studies have also examined children’s understanding of a
specific type of prosocial lie, called a “blue lie” (Fu et al., 2007; Fu et al., 2008).
Blue lies are told to benefit a collective, sometimes at the expense of an
individual, and thus serve a prosocial purpose. For example, when someone on a
team sport knows they aren’t very good, they may tell a blue lie by pretending to
be sick during an important sporting event so that the team has a better chance of
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winning. Fu and colleagues (2008) investigated children’s evaluations of blue lies
and the relation of these evaluations to their blue lie-telling behaviors in a twopart study; the study involved children ages seven, nine, and eleven years old
from China. The first experiment (N = 294) explored children’s lie-telling
behaviors when put in a staged situation where they had to choose between lying
for a collective of their peers (i.e., telling a prosocial blue lie) or telling the truth.
As children increased in age, they were more likely to lie in the staged situation.
The children also heard vignettes involving moral dilemmas where a child
protagonist faced decisions about lying or telling the truth in situations where
lying was more beneficial to the self or to the collective. Children were then asked
whether the characters in the vignettes should lie or tell the truth. The researchers
found as age increased, children were more inclined to lie for the collective
(prosocial lying) and less inclined to lie for the self, and this was related to their
own lying behaviors in the staged real-life situation. More specifically, all age
groups were more likely to lie for the collective than the self, but seven-year-olds
were close to chance, while nine- and eleven-year-olds were above chance for
choosing the character to lie for the collective, further indicating that as children
age they become more willing to engage in lie-telling behaviors if the lie is told
with a prosocial intention.
The second experiment conducted by these authors (N = 291) delved
further into children’s moral judgments of blue lies. A similar methodology was
used as Experiment 1 with the exception that the vignettes in this part involved
the protagonist actually lying or telling the truth in the given scenarios instead of
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just considering which option to do. Experimenters then asked the children to
evaluate the lie- or truth-telling in the vignettes on a seven-point scale ranging
from “very very bad” to “very very good.” Consistent with Experiment 1, the
findings from Experiment 2 indicated that as age increased, children rated lying
for the self more negatively than lying for the prosocial purpose. Seven-year-old
children evaluated lying for the collective negatively, while nine-year-old children
evaluated this type of prosocial lying neutrally, and eleven-year-olds evaluated it
positively, emphasizing a developmental trend that as children age they become
more accepting of blue lie-telling. Importantly, these older children not only
evaluated blue lies less negatively than the younger children, but they actually
evaluated the prosocial blue lies positively, demonstrating a critical change in
moral understanding.
Summary
As children grow older, they become more concerned with others as
opposed to themselves in terms of their moral reasoning. Children also become
more in tune to the intentions behind others’ actions and more accepting of lying
for prosocial reasons – they sometimes even prefer it. An open question is
whether children can use their judgments of a person’s intentions when engaging
in a lie-telling behavior to evaluate whether that individual is a reliable source of
information.
Children’s Selective Trust in Informants
A growing body of research has examined how children’s trust in the
testimony of informants is influenced by the previous reliability of the informants
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(e.g. Corriveau, Pickard, & Harris, 2010; Krogh-Jespersen & Echols, 2012). For
example, Krogh-Jespersen and Echols (2012) proposed that children have a
default trust in adult testimony that aids in learning novel information, but that
indications of being an unreliable source of information can violate that trust.
Their study examined two-year-old children’s (N = 160) willingness to learn
novel labels for familiar and novel objects from a single informant. Results
indicated that when the object was novel and children had no other information to
rely upon, they accepted labeling information from an unreliable informant. In
contrast, when the object was familiar and children had a label for that object,
they rejected the information provided by an unreliable informant. In both
conditions, when the informant was a reliable source of information, two-year-old
children were willing to learn the novel label for both novel and familiar objects.
Thus, children are attending to the reliability of an informant when determining
whether to accept novel label information.
Krogh-Jespersen and Echols (2012) utilized a single informant
methodology adapted to the capabilities of younger children to decrease the
memory demands for their task. Another paradigm for measuring children’s
willingness to learn novel information is a two-informant task, in which one
informant is reliable and the other is unreliable. This task is appropriate for older
children who have greater memory capabilities. Corriveau, Pickard, and Harris
(2010) utilized this two-informant paradigm to examine four-year-old children’s
selective trust in information provided by either reliable or unreliable informants.
Reliability in this study was presented to children as whether the informants
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provided appropriate labels for a series of familiar objects: one informant always
provided accurate labels (labeled a stuffed dog with the appropriate label “dog”)
and one with inaccurate labels (labeled a stuffed dog with a different familiar
label, for example, “banana”). Following four familiarization trials, children
participated in four trials of a novel object labeling task, in which each informant
labeled a novel object with a different novel label (e.g., “This is a roke” vs. “This
is a cham”). Children were asked to choose which label they believed applied to
the novel object; thereby endorsing one of the informants. Results indicated that
four-year-old children endorsed the information provided by the previously
accurate informant. In a second part of this study, researchers replicated this
finding with morphological forms of words. For the familiarization trials, one
informant consistently used correct morphology (e.g., “Here are some shoes”)
while the other informant consistently used incorrect morphological forms (e.g.,
“Here are some shoe”). The test trials included novel morphological forms (e.g.,
“Yesterday he glang” vs “Yesterday he glung”). Using a two-informant paradigm
allows researchers to evaluate whether children have a preference for learning
novel information from a reliable informant in comparison to an unreliable
informant.
A similar study conducted by Birch, Vauthier, and Bloom (2008) further
demonstrated children’s trust in testimony with a slightly different task and
extended previous findings beyond word learning to object functions as well. In
their study, three- to four-year-old children participated in a history phase in
which two puppets each labeled four common objects. One puppet consistently
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labeled all of the objects accurately, whereas the other puppet labeled all of the
objects using a familiar but incorrect word. Next, children participated in a testing
phase that consisted of a preference condition and a contrast condition. Each
condition included the presentation of two pairs of novel objects. In the
preference condition, both puppets applied the same label (e.g. a “ferber”) to two
different objects. Then, the experimenter asked children to hand them the
“ferber.” In the contrast condition, again both puppets applied the same label to
two different objects, but in this condition the experimenter asked children to
hand them an item that had a different object label. For example, the puppets each
labeled different objects as a “koba” and the experimenter asked the child to hand
them the “modi.” In this condition, if children applied the novel label to the object
that the accurate puppet endorsed, they should be more willing to hand the
experimenter the other object (i.e., the object labeled by the inaccurate puppet).
Consistent with predictions, results indicated that children chose the object
labeled by the previously accurate puppet in the preference tasks and chose the
object labeled by the previously inaccurate puppet in the contrast tasks.
Following the novel object label trials, children participated in a second
reliability study examining their willingness to learn object functions from
accurate vs. inaccurate informants. In this study, the familiarization phase
involved one puppet applying correct object functions to familiar objects (e.g., the
puppet says the object is for brushing your teeth when referring to a toothbrush),
and one puppet applying incorrect object functions to the same familiar objects
(e.g., the puppet says the toothbrush is for cleaning your face). The test trials were
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similar to that of the first study, such that the two puppets applied the same object
function to two different novel objects (e.g., they both stated that different novel
objects are “for cleaning a toaster”). Then, the experimenter asked the child for
the object that is used for cleaning a toaster. As in the first study, there were also
contrast trials. The results indicated that children endorsed the accurate puppet’s
information in the preference condition for object functions but were at chance for
the contrast condition. Although the effect for object functions was not as strong
in the contrast condition as it was for object labels, the results from this series of
studies demonstrate that children’s selective trust in testimony is not exclusive to
the word learning domain as there are similar patterns when learning about object
functions.
Children may make judgments regarding selective trust based on factors
other than reliability; in fact, recent research has examined whether young infants
attend to group membership as a cue regarding which informant is providing the
most accurate information. Buttelmann et al. (2013) examined 14-month-old
infants’ selective trust in informants based on in-group or out-group membership,
with group membership determined by the language each informant spoke. This
study examined object preference and imitation using the single-informant
paradigm, which is suited for an infant population. First, participants watched a
familiarization video featuring the informant telling a short story either in the
participants’ native language (in-group language condition) or an unfamiliar
foreign language (out-group language condition). Following this video, infants
participated in two imitation tasks that involved watching a video of the informant
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performing an unusual action on an object (e.g., turning on a touch lamp with
his/her head). The experimenter then gave the same object to the infant for 60
seconds and coded whether the infant performed the unusual action on the object
at any point during the time-frame. The infants also participated in two preference
trials that involved watching a video of the informant examining two objects and
demonstrating a preference for one of the objects. The objects were then placed in
front of the infant to determine which object the child preferred (e.g., which
object the infant touched first). The findings indicated that infants in the in-group
language condition were more likely to imitate the unusual action than those in
the out-group condition. However, for the preference tasks, infants’ choices did
not differ from chance. Thus, at 14 months of age, selective learning from ingroup informants was only evident for the imitation tasks.
Not only does group membership influence selective trust, but it also has
been shown to influence children’s social preferences. In a study conducted by
Kinzler and colleagues (2009), researchers investigated the influence of foreign
accents, foreign language, and race on five-year-old children’s friendship choices.
In Experiment 1 of the study, children viewed two faces on a screen and listened
to voice clips for each of the photographs including American-accented English,
French, and French-accented English. The experimenter then asked the children to
select the child with whom they would want to be friends. Findings from
Experiment 1 indicated that children demonstrated a preference for native
language over foreign language as well as native accent over foreign accent when
choosing friends. Experiment 2 utilized this same methodology to investigate
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whether comprehensibility of the language influences children’s friendship
preferences. When asked which child they understood, children selected the child
with the foreign accent over the child with the foreign language. But when asked
with whom they would rather be friends, there was no significant difference
between the child speaking in a foreign accent versus the child speaking in a
foreign language, indicating that comprehensibility of a social partner is not
necessarily a cue for social group membership. Experiment 3 of this study again
utilized the same methodology to investigate whether children’s social
preferences are more so based on race or accent. Findings from this experiment
indicated that when no audio information was available, children demonstrated a
preference of the white child over the black child. Most of the children in this
study were white, so this preference was expected due to previous research
findings. Interestingly, when the photograph of the white child was paired with a
foreign accent and the photograph of the black child was paired with a native
accent, children demonstrated a friend preference for the black child with the
native accent. Results from this study indicate that children’s social preferences
are more complex than simply visual information about another child when other
information is available, such as language or accent.
Summary
Previous research has demonstrated infants’ and children’s selective trust
in testimony across multiple domains, including novel word learning, object
functions, and imitation, using a single informant and two-informant paradigms.
Results from these studies support the proposal that children use information
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about an informant, including his or her knowledge state and group membership,
to determine whether that informant is a reliable source of new information or to
choose friends. Yet, there are a number of open questions regarding the factors
that children attend to when determining whom to trust when learning novel
information.
Research Aims
This research study aimed to examine whether children make selective
judgments regarding whether an informant is a reliable source of novel
information depending on that informant’s intentions when lying. Specifically,
children’s ability to differentiate between prosocial liars and self-serving liars was
examined across the following three areas: children’s willingness to learn novel
information from liars, their friend preferences, and their visual attention to liars.
This thesis also examined age-related differences as well as theory of mind
differences in children’s understanding of deceptive informants.
Statement of Hypotheses
The following hypotheses proposed developmental differences in selective
trust across age, with younger children (4-6-year-olds) avoiding learning from
liars regardless of intentionality, slightly older children (7-9-year-olds) showing a
period of transition in their understanding of intentionality as it relates to
deceptive behavior, and older children (10-11-year-olds) showing a preference to
learn from a prosocial liar and an active avoidance to trust the self-serving liar.
The hypotheses also proposed differences in friend preferences and visual
attention across lying conditions.
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Willingness to learn. Hypothesis I. As age and moral theory of mind
scores increase, children will be more likely to trust information from the
prosocial informant compared to the neutral informant.
Hypothesis II. As age and moral theory of mind scores increase, children
will be less likely to trust information from the self-serving informant compared
to the neutral informant.
Friend preference task. Hypothesis III. Children will more often choose
to be friends with the prosocial informant compared to the neutral informant and
this pattern will become more prominent with age.
Hypothesis IV. Children will less likely choose to be friends with the selfserving informant compared to the neutral informant and this pattern will become
more prominent with age.
Visual attention. Hypothesis V. Children will attend differentially to
faces in the prosocial lying condition than in the self-serving lying condition. This
aspect of the current thesis was exploratory in nature as visual attention
differences would not be predicted based on previous accounts of children’s
reliance on informants with varying levels of reliability. One possibility was that
children will attend to the faces of the prosocial liar and the self-serving liar
differently when compared to attention to the neutral informant.
Method
Participants
Participants included 130 children (n = 76 boys, n = 54 girls) between the
ages of 4 and 11 years of age. In order to ensure variability in age, participants
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were recruited according to membership in one of four age groups: 4-5-year-olds
(n = 32, age range = 48-71 months, mean age = 60.19 months, n = 18 males), 6-7year-olds (n = 32, age range = 72-95 months, mean age = 85.00 months, n = 17
males), 8-9-year-olds (n = 32, age range = 96-119 months, mean age = 107.38
months, n = 18 males), and 10-11-year-olds (n = 19, age range = 121-138 months,
mean age = 127.68 months, n = 12 males). Participants’ parents completed an
optional demographic form for their child for which 52.31% did not respond to
ethnicity and 50.77% did not respond to child’s proficient languages, although all
participants were fluent in English. Of the participants with responses, ethnicities
were 62.90% Caucasian, 9.68% Hispanic, 9.68% mixed, 8.06% AfricanAmerican, 4.84% Asian, and 4.84% other. Further, parents indicated whether
children were only exposed to the English language or whether the children had
been exposed to other languages; 73.44% of children were exposed to English
only and 26.56% were exposed to at least one other language.
Fifteen participants were excluded from analysis due to having greater
than 2 missing answers (n = 13) or due to technical problems with the eyetracking computer (n = 2), for a total of 115 participants in the final dataset. All
participants were recruited through the Museum of Science and Industry, Chicago
and participated in this study in a designated space there. Participants received a
small token of appreciation, such as stickers, erasers, or pencils upon completion
of the study.
Materials and Procedure
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The study used a 2 (Informant: liar, neutral) x 2 (Lying Type: prosocial,
self-serving) mixed design with informant as a repeated-measures factor and lying
type as a between subjects factor. Therefore, each participant experienced a liar
and a neutral informant, with three types of Willingness to Learn trials - novel
label, action imitation, and novel function – and a Friend Preference task. Some
participants (n = 54) additionally completed a moral theory of mind task, which
was added to the study design at a later timepoint.
Children were seated next to an experimenter in front of a 17.3-inch laptop
equipped with a Tobii x3-120 mobile eye tracker. The experimenter explained to
the participant that they would watch a series of videos of her friends. Two
familiarization videos featuring the lying and the neutral informants were
presented individually (described below). The order of presentation of the neutral
and lying informants was pre-set and counterbalanced across participants such
that half of participants saw the neutral informant first and half saw the lying
informant first. Following the familiarization videos, the experimenter explained
to the participant that they were going watch her friends name some items and
that she would ask the participant a few questions. Children then participated in
the following three tasks (described below) that were designed to examine their
willingness to trust the testimony provided by the informants: the novel object
label task, the action imitation task, and the novel object function task.
Following these tasks, for the children who did not participate in the
Moral Theory of Mind task (n = 61), the experimenter then posed the Friend
Preference task question (described below). For the children who further
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completed the Moral Theory of Mind task (n = 54), the experimenter posed the
Friend Preference task question, and then explained to the children that they
would hear a short story and answer a few more questions. Upon completion of
the study, the experimenter offered participants a prize from the prize box.
Familiarization videos. Participants each watched two videos designed to
introduce them to the two informants appearing in the subsequent tasks: one video
featured a neutral informant and the other featured an informant who lies. Both
informants were female. The type of lie being told was a between-subjects factor,
with children either viewing an informant engaging in a prosocial lie or a selfserving lie.
Prosocial lying. The prosocial lying familiarization video introduced
children to the prosocial intentions that motivated one informant’s lying behavior.
The video started with a woman looking directly into the camera and saying she
didn’t like a toy that her friend gave her for her birthday. Then her friend was
heard approaching off-camera, so the woman turned slightly to address her. The
friend then asked if the woman liked her birthday gift. Even though she did not
like the gift, she told her friend that she liked it anyway (see Appendix A for the
verbal scripts for the familiarization trials).
Self-Serving lying. The self-serving lying familiarization video introduced
children to the self-serving intentions that motivated one informant’s lying
behavior. The video started with a woman looking directly into the camera and
saying that she accidentally broke her friend’s toy. Then her friend was heard
approaching off-camera, so the woman turned slightly to address her. The friend
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then asked if the woman knew what happened to her broken toy. Even though the
woman knew she broke the toy herself, she told her friend that the toy was already
broken when she got there.
Neutral control. The neutral familiarization video introduced children to
an informant who was not a liar. The video started with a woman looking directly
into the camera and saying that she really liked a toy and wondered if her friend
would like it too. Then her friend was heard approaching off-camera, so the
woman turned slightly to address her. The friend then asked the woman if the
item was her toy, to which she replied yes and that she thought it was pretty cool.
Selective Trust Tasks. After viewing the familiarization videos of one of
the lying informants and a neutral informant, all participants engaged in three
types of selective trust tasks: the novel object label task, the action imitation task,
and the novel object function task. Each task consisted of two trials. Task order
was pre-set, but the object labels, functions, and actions performed by the
informants were counterbalanced.
Novel object label task. This task assessed children’s willingness to learn
a novel label from the informants across two trials. Each trial began with a video
of each of the informants (i.e., one neutral and one liar) presenting a different
novel label for the same novel object (e.g., “That’s a gep” vs. “That’s a dax”).
Immediately after watching both videos, an image of the novel object appeared on
the screen and the participant was prompted by the experimenter to endorse one
of the two novel labels that the informants provided (e.g., “Would you call that a
gep or a dax?”) The child gave a verbal response. This procedure was repeated
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with different novel labels (“That’s a blicket” vs. “That’s a dawnu”) for a
different novel object on the second trial. Each child received a score across the
two trials, representing the proportion of trials in which the child endorsed the
novel label provided by the lying informant.

Figure 1. Novel object label task example.
Action imitation task. This task assessed participants’ selective trust in the
informants’ knowledge about how to perform novel actions. Participants viewed
two videos – one video of each informant performing an action on the same
object. In one trial, one informant turned on a toy with her elbow, whereas the
other informant turned on the same toy with her forehead. In a second trial, each
informant built the same set of blocks in a different way. Before producing the
action, each informant stated: “I [use the item] like this” (e.g., “I build the blocks
like this” or “I turn it on like this”). Immediately after watching both videos, the
experimenter asked, “Out of those two ways, how would you do it?” The child
was then presented with the object and given the opportunity to perform the
action of their choosing on it. Each child received a score across the two trials,
representing the proportion of trials in which the child imitated the action
performed by the lying informant.
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Figure 2. Action imitation task example.
Novel object function task. This task measured children’s selective trust
in the informants’ knowledge about how novel objects work. This task was
similar to the novel object label task except instead of labeling objects, the
informants described how they each use the same object (e.g., “That’s for holding
pencils” vs. “That’s for working out”). Then an image of the object was presented
on the screen and the experimenter prompted the participant, “Would you use this
for working out or holding pencils?” This task also included a second trial in
which a different object was used along with two different functions (“That’s for
picking up toys” vs. “That’s for carrying a water bottle”). The child’s verbal
response was recorded. Similar to the above tasks, each child received a score
across the two trials, representing the proportion of trials in which the child
endorsed the function performed by the lying informant.
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Figure 3. Novel object function task example.
Friend Preference Task. Following the three selective trust tasks, the
experimenter prompted the child with one question, which was used to address
children’s social preferences. This question examined whether children encoded
the intentionality information related to the liar in comparison to the neutral
informant. Two images were presented side-by-side to the participant – one of the
neutral informant and one of the lying informant. The experimenter then posed
the question: “Who would you rather have as your friend?” Children were
assigned one point if they pointed to the lying informant.
Moral Theory of Mind Task. Following the Friend Preference task (for
children who participated in the study after the decision to add a theory of mind
task; n = 54) the experimenter read each child a short story adapted from the
Accidental Transgressor task (Killen et al., 2011), which was as follows:
“Emma (Ethan) and Sarah (Steven) are classmates. One day, Emma brings
a cupcake to school and puts it in a paper bag because she wants to eat it after
school. Then she goes out to play. Sarah comes in to help the teacher with
cleaning the room and notices the bag left on the table. Sarah throws the bag in
the trash.”
The characters in the story were matched to the child’s gender. The story
was read aloud as the experimenter moved or pointed to paper images of the
characters and items from the story (see Appendix B). Following the story,
children were asked five questions for which participants received 1 point for
each correct answer. Points were summed for each participant such that each
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participant received a score between 0 and 5, with a score of 5 meaning all
questions were answered correctly, demonstrating a higher level moral theory of
mind. The questions along with examples of correct answers were as follows:
1) What did Sarah, the girl who threw out the bag, think was in the bag?
(trash, nothing)
2) What was really in the bag? (a cupcake)
3) Where will Emma look for her cupcake when she comes back to the
classroom? (on the table, where she left it)
4) Where is the cupcake really located? (trash bin)
5) When Sarah threw out the bag, did she think she was doing something
that was “all right” or “not all right”? Why? (all right)
Apparatus
All of the familiarization videos, task videos and images, and the friend
preference question images were displayed on a computer screen equipped with a
Tobii eye-tracker. Thus, eye-tracking data were collected throughout the study
using a mobile eye-tracker (Tobii x3-120). The data collected from the Tobii eyetracker were analyzed in regards to Hypothesis V, addressing whether children’s
visual attention differs across conditions. For the purpose of this study, we
focused on visual attention to the image of the informants displayed side-by-side
during the Friend Preference task. Areas of Interest (AOIs) were generated for
each of the informants’ faces to determine whether attention to the informants
differed by informant type (lying or neutral; see Figure 4 below).
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Figure 4. Areas of Interest of same size and proportion created for
informant faces.
Results
Willingness to Learn
Hypothesis I predicted that as children increase in age, they will be more
likely to trust information from the prosocial lying informant compared to the
neutral informant. For this analysis, age was measured in months, and willingness
to trust the prosocial lying informant was measured in terms of the proportion of
times a child endorsed the information from the lying informant out of the 6 total
trials (or the number of trials completed by each participant for instances
involving missing data for some of the trials). To test this hypothesis, a simple
linear regression was conducted and found that age in months was a significant
predictor of willingness to learn from the prosocial lying informant, such that as
for every increase in one month of age, children’s proportion of willingness to
learn from the prosocial liar increased by 0.33 percent (meaning about a 3.96
percent increase per year of age) (F(1,56) = 8.41, p = .005), with an R2 of 0.131
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(see Figure 5 below). As part of Hypothesis I, I further wanted to examine
whether an increase in moral theory of mind scores predicted an increase in
children’s willingness to learn from the prosocial lying informant. Another simple
linear regression was conducted and found that for every increase in theory of
mind score, children’s proportion of willingness to learn from the prosocial liar
increased by 11.75 percent, (F(1,24) = 7.68, p = .01), with an R2 of 0.242. Thus,
Hypothesis I was supported, in that both age and moral theory of mind were
significant predictors of willingness to learn from the prosocial lying informant in
the predicted direction.

Figure 5. Simple linear regression with age in months predicting
proportion of children willing to learn novel information from the
prosocial lying informant.

29
Hypothesis II predicted that as children increase in age, they will be less
likely to trust information from the self-serving lying informant compared to the
neutral informant. For this analysis, age was measured in months, and willingness
to trust the lying informant was measured in terms of the proportion of times a
child endorsed the information from the self-serving lying informant out of the 6
total trials (or the number of trials completed by each participant for instances
involving missing data for some of the trials). To test this hypothesis, a simple
linear regression was conducted and found that age in months was not a
significant predictor of willingness to learn from the self-serving lying informant,
such that as for every increase in one month of age, children’s proportion of
willingness to learn from the liar decreased by 0.06 percent (meaning about a 0.7
percent decrease per year of age) (F(1,55) = 0.29, p = .59), with an R2 of 0.005
(see Figure 6 below). This did not support our prediction, but was in the expected
direction. As part of Hypothesis II, we also wanted to examine whether an
increase in moral theory of mind scores predicted a decrease in children’s
willingness to learn from the self-serving lying informant. Another simple linear
regression was conducted and found that for every increase in theory of mind
score, children’s proportion of willingness to learn from the self-serving liar
decreased by 7.36 percent, (F(1,26) = 3.99, p = .056), with an R2 of 0.133,
indicating marginal significance. Thus, Hypothesis II was not supported with age
as a predictor of willingness to learn from the self-serving lying informant, but
was marginally supported for moral theory of mind as a predictor. Importantly,
both age and moral theory of mind were in the predicted direction – older children
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were systematically less willing to trust information from the self-serving liar than
younger children.

Figure 6. Simple linear regression with age in months predicting
proportion of children willing to learn novel information from the selfserving lying informant.
Willingness to Learn by Task Type
Simple linear regressions were conducted to determine differences by task
type for the three willingness to learn tasks – novel object label, action imitation,
and novel object function – for each lying condition. For the Prosocial Condition,
analyses show that willingness to learn from the liar in the novel object label task
was significantly predicted by age and marginally significantly predicted by moral
theory of mind score. Willingness to learn in the action imitation task was
significantly predicted by moral theory of mind score, but not age. Finally,
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willingness to learn in the novel object function task had no significant predictors.
See Tables 1 and 2 below; see Table 7 in Appendix C for a breakdown by age
group.
Novel Object Label
b
SE
p

Action Imitation
SE
p

Novel Object Function
b
SE
p

Action Imitation
SE
P

Novel Object Function
B
SE
p

b
Age
0.0054 0.0019 .0056* 0.0024 0.0020 .2369 0.0015 0.0018 .4152
(months)
R2
0.129
0.025
0.012
Table 1. Willingness to learn (Prosocial Condition) by task type with age as a
predictor.
*Significant at .05 level.

Novel Object Label
b
SE
p

b

Age
0.1248 0.0675 .0766* 0.2209 0.0558 .0006** 0.0172 0.0721 .8140
(months)
R2
0.125
0.395
0.002
Table 2. Willingness to learn (Prosocial Condition) by task type with moral theory
of mind as a predictor.
*Significant at .10 level.
**Significant at .05 level.
For the Self-Serving Condition, analyses show that willingness to learn
from the liar in the novel object label task was only marginally significantly
predicted by moral theory of mind score. No other significant relations were
found. See Tables 3 and 4 below; see Table 8 in Appendix C for a breakdown by
age group.

32
Novel Object Label
b
SE
p

b

Action Imitation
SE
p

Novel Object Function
b
SE
p

Age
-0.0020 0.0018 .267 -0.0007 0.0017
.6933 0.0005 0.0019 .783
(months)
R2
0.022
0.003
0.001
Table 3. Willingness to learn (Self-Serving Condition) by task type with age as a
predictor.
Novel Object Label
b
SE
p

Action Imitation
SE
p

Novel Object Function
B
SE
p

b
Age
-0.1101 0.0606 .0809* -0.0376 0.0623 .5510 -0.0705 0.062
(months)
R2
0.129
0.014
0.047
Table 4. Willingness to learn (Self-Serving Condition) by task type with moral
theory of mind as a predictor.
*Significant at .10 level.
Friend Preference
Hypothesis III predicted that children in the prosocial lying condition will
choose to be friends with the prosocial lying informant at greater than chance
levels (chance = 0.50). A one-sample t-test was conducted comparing the
proportion of children choosing the prosocial lying informant as a friend (M =
0.36) to chance. Although there was a significant difference at the 95% level,
t(48) = -2.23, p = .031, it was not in the predicted direction. Instead, children were
actually less likely to choose the prosocial lying informant compared to chance.
This did not support the hypothesis.
Hypothesis IV predicted that children in the self-serving lying condition
will choose to be friends with the self-serving lying informant at lower than
chance levels (chance = 0.50). A one-sample t-test was conducted comparing the
proportion of children choosing the lying informant as a friend (M = 0.38) to

.266
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chance. The difference was not significant at the 95% level, t(52) = -1.82, p =
.074, however it was trending in the expected direction. Children were marginally
less likely to choose the self-serving lying informant compared to chance.
Collapsing the results across conditions, children chose to be friends with
the lying informant at a mean proportion of 0.36. This was significantly different
from chance at the 95% significance level, t(101) = -2.87, p = .005. This indicates
that overall, children tended to avoid being friends with a lying informant,
regardless of the intention behind the lies.
Friend Preference by Age and Moral Theory of Mind
Logistic regression analyses were conducted to examine age as a predictor
of children’s friend preference of the liar compared to the neutral informant for
each of the lying conditions. Results of both Wald’s tests indicated that age was
not a significant predictor of friend preference in the prosocial lying condition,
χ2(1) = 0.3, p = .58, but was a marginally significant predictor of friend preference
in the self-serving lying condition, χ 2(1) = 3.4, p = .065 such that older children
were less likely to prefer being friends with the self-serving lying informant (see
Table 9 in Appendix C for a breakdown by age group).
Logistic regression analyses were also conducted to examine moral theory
of mind as a predictor of children’s friend preference for each of the lying
conditions. However, results of both Wald’s tests indicated that moral theory of
mind was neither significant for the prosocial lying condition, χ2(1) = 1.5, p = .22,
nor the self-serving lying condition, χ2(1) = 0.21, p = .64.
Visual Attention

34
Visual attention to the informants was analyzed in the side-by-side
comparison of informants in the friend preference task for the purposes of this
study. Mean proportions of total time spent attending to the lying and neutral
informants’ faces in relation to total time spent attending to the entire scene were
compared across lying conditions, but no significant differences were found,
indicating that both informants were attended to for a similar proportion of time.
See Table 5 below for proportions of total time spent looking at the lying versus
neutral informants in each of the lying conditions and the corresponding t-test
analysis results.
Informant
Prosocial Condition
Self-Serving Condition
t
df
Lying
0.302
0.330
-1.06
103
Neutral
0.309
0.319
-0.414 103
Table 5. Mean proportions of total time spent looking at the lying versus neutral
informants in the Friend Preference task and corresponding t-tests.

Given that both types of informants were attended to for similar durations
of time across conditions, we next examined whether there were differences in
participants’ first gaze to the informants for the Friend Preference task, more
specifically whether the gaze was directed to the lying informant or the neutral
informant first. Again, no differences were found between lying conditions,
although the means were in the predicted direction, with the proportion of
participants who looked at the liar first in the self-serving condition (M = 0.58)
being slightly but not significantly larger than the proportion of participants who
looked at the liar first in the prosocial condition (M = 0.51), t(103) = 0.69, p =
.492.

p
.292
.680
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Finally, we examined whether first gaze on the Friend Preference task was
related to children’s Willingness to Learn preferences in order to determine
whether children’s attention was initially drawn to the liar or neutral informant in
accordance with which informant they had been willing to learn from. Children
were organized into three groups according to 1) whether they demonstrated a
preference for the liar (meaning that they endorsed information from the lying
informant in more Willingness to Learn trials than the neutral informant; e.g. the
proportion of trials endorsing information from the lying informant was greater
than 0.50 for each participant), 2) whether they demonstrated a preference for the
neutral informant, or 3) whether they demonstrated equal preference (meaning
children endorsed information from the liar and neutral informant equally in the
Willingness to Learn trials). See Table 6 for proportion of first gazes to the lying
informant’s face, proportion of total time spent attending to each of the
informants’ faces in relation to total time spent attending to the scene for each of
the three specified groups, and the corresponding ANOVA results.
Preferred to
Total Fixation
Total Fixation
Learn From:
n
1st Gaze to Liar
Lying Informant
Neutral Informant
Lying Informant
38
0.42
0.32
0.31
Neutral Informant 37
0.51
0.31
0.34
Equal Preference
30
0.73
0.31
0.29
F (2,102)
3.524
0.019
1.86
p-value
.033*
.981
.161
Table 6. Proportion of first gaze to the liar, proportion of total fixation duration to
the lying informant, (collapsed across intentionality conditions) and proportion of
total fixation duration to the neutral informant by Willingness to Learn preference
group type.
*Significant at .05 level.
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Through further analysis of the first gaze to the liar by group type, we
found a significant difference from chance that indicated when children had equal
preference of informants in the Willingness to Learn trials, they tended to attend
to the lying informant first (mean proportion = 0.73) when deciding which
informant to choose as a friend, t(29) = 2.841, p = .008. The other two groups
(those who had a preference for either the lying informant or the neutral
informant) did not differ from chance in terms of whether their first gaze was
directed to the lying or neutral informant, t(37) = -0.973, p = .337, and t(36) =
0.162, p = .872, respectively.
Discussion
The purpose of this thesis was to examine whether children have a
nuanced understanding of lying depending on a lie-teller’s intentions. Specifically
examining whether, as children age and become more skilled in moral theory of
mind, they develop a more sophisticated understanding of lie-telling behaviors,
meaning they can distinguish that a person who engages in prosocial lying
behavior may still be a good source of information, even though he or she
provided inaccurate information in the past. Thus, an open question was whether
children are able to consider the contexts for lie-telling behavior when
determining whether to trust new information from an informant, when
determining friend preferences, and whether this is reflected in children’s visual
attention.
Regarding children’s willingness to trust new information from a lying
informant, evidence supported these hypotheses in the predicted directions – that
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as children increased in age and moral theory of mind, they were more willing to
trust new information from a prosocial lying informant and less willing to trust
new information from a self-serving lying informant compared to a neutral
informant. This pattern demonstrates that children do judge these two types of lies
differently and the pattern becomes more prominent in older children. This
suggests that children do have a nuanced understanding of lying depending on
whether the liar has prosocial or self-serving intentions. This is consistent with
previous findings, that older children in this age group become more accepting of
prosocial lying and less accepting of self-serving lying than their younger
counterparts. However, the relationship was less strong for the self-serving lying
condition and was only approaching significance with moral theory of mind as a
predictor of trust, and no relation with age, inconsistent with other findings. This
difference in results could be due to differences in methodology. The current
study utilized a methodology where each child only saw one version of a lying
scenario, while other research methodologies have involved each child evaluating
multiple versions of each type of lying scenario and creating a composite score of
their evaluations (e.g. Fu et al., 2007; Fu et al., 2008; Lee et al., 1997). Further,
the current study had each child evaluate only one type of lying (prosocial or selfserving), while other research has had each child make evaluations on multiple
lying types (e.g. blue lying vs. self-serving; Fu et al., 2007; Fu et al., 2008).
Having each child evaluate multiple types of lying (prosocial and self-serving)
may result in more defined differences in children’s evaluations of each of these
types compared to a decision to choose between each of these types of lying
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informant and a neutral informant to trust information. On the other hand, it is
also possible that children are more sensitive to prosocial lies than to the selfserving lies when deciding from whom to learn. A prosocial liar may have a halo
effect, in which children view the informant as having generally positive traits,
including a bias toward being helpful when providing information. It is less clear
whether children determine that a self-serving liar is generally not helpful or, in
this case, not knowledgeable.
It was also predicted that as children increase in age and moral theory of
mind skills, they will be more likely to choose the prosocial lying informant as a
friend and less likely to choose the self-serving lying informant as a friend in
comparison to a neutral informant. Unexpectedly, this was only partially
supported in that overall, regardless of lying condition, children tended to avoid
being friends with any type of liar and preferred the neutral informant as a friend.
The only age-related finding was that older children were less likely than younger
children to prefer the liar in the self-serving condition. So interestingly, even
though children became more trusting of the prosocial lying informant, they still
generally preferred to have a friend who does not lie.
Additionally, there were differences in visual attention to the lying
informants compared to the neutral informants in the Friend Preference task by
Willingness to Learn preference group type. More specifically, children who had
an equal preference for the lying and neutral informants in the Willingness to
Learn trials tended to attend to the lying informant first. This could indicate that
when children did not know who to trust in the Willingness to Learn trials, they
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visually attended first to the lying informant to look for information when making
the Friend Preference decision.
Thus overall, children do seem to use information regarding previous
intentionality of an informant to make future decisions on whether to trust novel
information from that individual, which is in line with research demonstrating that
children and infants selectively trust informants based on previous information on
the reliability and accuracy of the informants (Birch, Vauthier, & Bloom, 2008;
Corriveau, Pickard, & Harris, 2010; Krogh-Jespersen & Echols, 2012). This
pattern of results also seems to correspond with research findings on children’s
use of prosocial lying (Talwar, Murphy, & Lee, 2007) and evaluations of
prosocial lies (Fu et al., 2007; Fu et al., 2008; Lee et al., 1997), which are rated
more positively and used more often by older children. But our results indicate
that this pattern may more so have to do with children’s moral theory of mind
than their explicit age. This makes sense given that those with higher levels of
moral theory of mind are better able to understand others’ mental state knowledge
and thus have the skills to better judge others’ intentions in nuanced situations,
making moral theory of mind a better predictor of children’s understanding of
prosocial lying than merely the numerical value of age.
Limitations of Research & Future Directions
One limitation of the study was that the group of 10-11-year-olds had a
smaller sample size than the other age groups due to adding that older age group
to the research study at a later timepoint. Perhaps a stronger relationship would
have been established between age or moral theory of mind and willingness to
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learn with a larger number of older participants, especially since the pattern in the
self-serving condition was not as strong as expected given the literature
demonstrating children’s increasing negative evaluations of self-serving lying as
children age (Fu et al., 2008; Lee et al., 1997).
One potential future direction to help elucidate children’s selective trust in
informants based on intentionality should involve directly contrasting the two
types of lying – prosocial and self-serving – instead of separately against a neutral
informant. This could address the question of whether all lying is an equally bad,
untrustworthy behavior or if children are more willing to trust a liar who has good
intentions. Also, since the results of the Friend Preference task did not match our
predictions, it might be important for future research to include a justification
question regarding why children chose one informant to be their friend over the
other in order to get a more in-depth understanding of the children’s choices.
Finally, since visual attention in this study was exploratory, future studies could
examine differences in visual attention for other tasks besides the Friend
Preference task.
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Appendix A. Familiarization Scripts
Prosocial Lying:
Close-up of informant talking to the audience with a toy placed in front of her.
Informant: “Ugh! I don’t like this toy. My friend, Susan, gave it to me. I don’t
want her to know I hate it. Oh, here she comes.”
Friend enters room off-screen. Informant turns slightly to face her.
Informant: “Hi, Susan.”
Friend (Susan): “Hi. Do you like the birthday gift from me?”
Informant: “Yes, I do. It’s my favorite toy, so thank you.”

Self-Serving Lying:
Close-up of informant talking to the audience with a toy place in front of her.
Informant: “Oh no! I broke this toy. My friend, Amy, let me borrow it. I don’t
want her to know I broke it. Oh, here she comes.”
Friend enters room off-screen. Informant turns slightly to face her.
Informant: “Hi, Amy.”
Friend (Amy): “Hi. Do you know what happened to my toy?”
Informant: “No, I don’t. It broke, but it wasn’t me.”

45
Appendix A Cont’d
Neutral Control:
Close-up of informant talking to the audience with a toy placed in front of her.
Informant: “Ooh! I like this toy. I just got it as a gift. I wonder if my friend,
Claire, will like it too. Oh, here she comes.”
Friend enters room off-screen. Informant turns slightly to face her.
Informant: “Hi, Claire.”
Friend (Claire): “Hi. Look at that; is that your toy?”
Informant: “Yes, it’s mine. And I think it’s pretty cool.”
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Appendix B. Morally Relevant Theory of Mind Images
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Appendix C. Tasks Across Age Groups

Age
n
Novel Label Action Imitation Novel Function
4-5
16
0.34
0.47
0.41
6-7
16
0.44
0.56
0.44
8-9
16
0.53
0.56
0.53
10-11
10
0.75
0.70
0.45
Table 7. Willingness to Learn tasks by age group for the Prosocial Condition.

Overall
0.39
0.49
0.55
0.63

Age
n
Novel Label
Action Imitation Novel Function
Overall
4-5
16
0.47
0.47
0.50
0.48
6-7
16
0.53
0.43
0.53
0.47
8-9
16
0.34
0.57
0.47
0.46
10-11
9
0.39
0.39
0.50
0.43
Table 8. Willingness to Learn tasks by age group for the Self-Serving Condition.

Prosocial
Self-Serving
Age
n
Proportion Liar
n
Proportion Liar
4-5
16
0.27
14
0.64
6-7
16
0.36
14
0.29
8-9
16
0.43
16
0.31
10-11
10
0.33
9
0.22
Table 9. Friend Preference task by age group and lying condition.

Prosocial
Self-Serving
Age
n
MoToM
n
MoToM
4-5
4
2.75
6
3.17
6-7
8
4.33
8
4.25
8-9
8
4.50
8
4.88
10-11
6
4.83
6
4.83
Table 10. Moral Theory of Mind task by age group and lying condition.

